Cyber Recovery & Assurance — recovery that's been tested, not just assumed.
Ransomware increasingly targets backup infrastructure specifically — encrypting or deleting backups before triggering the main attack. SIRI validates that your recovery capability actually survives that scenario, with the documented RTO/RPO RBI's framework now requires.
The assumption ransomware is specifically built to break
“We have backups” stopped being a sufficient answer once attackers started targeting the backups too.
Modern ransomware operations routinely include a reconnaissance phase specifically aimed at locating and disabling backup infrastructure before the encryption payload deploys — because a functioning backup is the single most effective defence against a ransom demand, and attackers know it. An organisation whose backup and production environments share credentials, network access, or infrastructure is frequently more exposed than it assumes.
ISO 22301:2019, the current international business continuity management standard, and RBI's 2026 Resilience & Assurance Framework both converge on the same underlying requirement: a Recovery Time Objective and Recovery Point Objective that have actually been tested, on a recurring cadence, not just documented once and left unverified. RBI's framework specifically mandates half-yearly disaster recovery drills with these objectives validated and recorded.
SIRI's Cyber Recovery and Assurance service validates the full chain — backup integrity, isolation from production credentials, actual restoration timing, and post-recovery security assurance — producing both an improved recovery capability and the documented evidence RBI's framework requires.
What organisations get wrong
Four assumptions that fail specifically when ransomware is involved
These are the gaps that turn a contained incident into a prolonged outage.
“Our backups are stored separately”
Separate storage doesn't mean isolated access — if backup infrastructure is reachable using the same compromised credentials as production, physical separation offers limited protection.
“We can always restore from last night's backup”
If an attacker had access before detection, the backup taken during that window may already be compromised — immutable backups with sufficient retention protect against restoring into a still-compromised state.
“Restoration takes about a day”
An estimate isn't a tested figure — actual restoration time depends on data volume, infrastructure readiness, and procedures that often haven't been exercised under realistic conditions since they were first documented.
“If it restores, we're done”
A restored system that's still running the vulnerability or misconfiguration that enabled the original incident isn't actually recovered — post-recovery security validation is a distinct step, not automatic.
What Cyber Recovery & Assurance covers
From backup validation to a documented, tested recovery capability
Built once, then re-validated on the cadence RBI's framework requires.
Backup Infrastructure Review
Assessing current backup architecture, isolation, and immutability against current standards.
- Backup architecture review
- Credential-isolation assessment
- Immutability & retention review
Recovery Time Testing
Actually restoring systems under realistic conditions to measure genuine recovery time.
- Full restoration testing
- RTO/RPO measurement
- Bottleneck identification
Backup Hardening
Implementing immutability, isolation, and retention improvements identified during assessment.
- Immutable backup configuration
- Credential & access isolation
- Retention policy alignment
Post-Recovery Security Assurance
Confirming a restored environment doesn't carry forward the vulnerability that caused the incident.
- Post-restoration security scan
- Vulnerability remediation confirmation
- Clean-state validation
Drill Documentation
Producing the RTO/RPO evidence RBI's framework specifically requires.
- Tested RTO/RPO record
- Drill outcome documentation
- Board-ready summary
Recurring Recovery Testing
Establishing the half-yearly testing cadence as an ongoing programme.
- Scheduled recurring drills
- Continuous improvement tracking
- Cadence-aligned reporting
Evidence, not guesswork
Assumed recovery vs. tested recovery — what actually differs when ransomware hits backups too
Both claim a Recovery Time Objective. Only one has confirmed it's real.
| Approach | Backups exist, untested | Documented RTO, never drilled | SIRI Recovery & Assurance |
|---|---|---|---|
| Backup infrastructure isolated from production credentials | Unconfirmed | Unconfirmed | Validated |
| Immutable backups against ransomware targeting | Unconfirmed | Unconfirmed | Validated |
| RTO/RPO actually tested via real restoration | No | No | Yes |
| Post-recovery security validation | No | No | Yes |
| Satisfies RBI's half-yearly drill requirement | No | No — documentation only | Yes |
Sources: ISO 22301:2019, Security and resilience — Business continuity management systems; RBI (Commercial Banks — Cybersecurity, Technology: Risk, Resilience and Assurance Framework) Directions, 2026, effective 31 July 2026. Summarised for comparison; confirm current drill and documentation requirements applicable to your entity category.
Numbers every board should know
What recovery testing actually confirms
RBI's drill requirement
Disaster recovery drills with documented, tested RTO/RPO under the 2026 Framework.
Backup principle
Three copies, two media types, one off-site or air-gapped — the baseline this service validates against.
Of malware detections
Are trojans and file infectors (Seqrite 2026) — frequently the entry point ahead of a ransomware deployment that also targets backups.
Signatures for evidence
Under Section 63 BSA — relevant if recovery evidence is later needed for a regulatory or legal matter.
Why SIRI for recovery assurance specifically
Recovery validated by the same team that would run it during a real incident
Not a generic backup audit — recovery testing informed directly by how modern ransomware actually targets backup infrastructure.
Testing informed by how ransomware actually behaves
Recovery validation specifically accounts for backup-targeting attack patterns, not just generic disaster scenarios like hardware failure.
Full-chain validation, not just a restore test
Backup isolation, immutability, actual restoration timing, and post-recovery security are all assessed together, not just whether a restore technically completes.
Documentation built for the regulation
Drill outcomes are recorded in the format RBI's framework expects, not just an internal note that a test occurred.
Connected to the rest of the resilience model
The same team validating recovery also runs SIRI Response, SOC monitoring, and Incident Readiness — recovery isn't assessed in isolation from the rest of your resilience posture.
Who this is built for
Organisations this recovery service is built for
How we work
From backup assessment to validated, documented recovery
Backup Assessment
Reviewing current backup architecture, isolation, and immutability.
Week 1Recovery Testing
Running an actual restoration to measure genuine RTO/RPO.
Week 2Hardening
Implementing immutability and isolation improvements identified.
Weeks 3–4Documentation & Cadence
Recording outcomes and scheduling the recurring drill programme.
Week 5+Frequently asked
Cyber Recovery & Assurance, answered directly
Why would ransomware target our backups specifically?
A functioning backup is the most effective defence against a ransom demand — attackers who locate and disable or encrypt backups before deploying the main payload significantly increase the pressure to pay. This is a documented, common pattern in modern ransomware operations, not a rare edge case.
What does 'immutable backup' actually mean in practice?
A backup that cannot be modified, encrypted, or deleted — even by an account with administrative credentials — within a defined retention window. This protects against an attacker who has already compromised production credentials from also destroying the recovery path.
How is a tested RTO different from a documented one?
A documented RTO is an estimate, often based on data volume calculations or vendor specifications. A tested RTO comes from actually performing a restoration under realistic conditions and measuring how long it genuinely takes — which frequently differs from the documented estimate, sometimes significantly.
Does this service include fixing the backup infrastructure, or just assessing it?
Both are available — the assessment identifies gaps, and hardening work (immutability configuration, credential isolation, retention policy changes) can be scoped as part of the same engagement or as a follow-on.
How does this connect to SIRI Response if we're recovering from an actual incident?
If recovery is happening as part of an active incident response, this capability integrates directly with SIRI Response — the same team coordinates containment, forensics, and validated recovery as one continuous engagement rather than a separate handoff.
Confirm your recovery actually works
Validate your recovery capability.
Start with a backup and DR assessment, or move straight to a full recovery test if you're preparing for an audit cycle.
Related
Other ways SIRI supports recovery and resilience
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SIRI Law LLP — Hyderabad, India
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